The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury

CHARLES M. SEVILLA*

"[I]t would be a dismal reflection on society to say that when
the guardians of its security are called to testify in court under
oath, their testimony must be viewed with suspicion."'
"The conclusion reached on the basis of this experience is that the
police2 are often not adverse to committing perjury to save a
case."
As repugnant a concept as it may seem, the guardians of our
security are quite capable of deliberately lying under oath in court
proceedings. It is too basic a concept to promulgate, but the police,
being human, are subject to the same biases, ulterior motivations,
and irrationalities that are the bases of perjured testimony by
other witnesses. For the most part, police perjury in courtrooms
of the United States is recognized by the defense bar, winked at
by the prosecution, ignored by the judiciary, and unknown to the
* B.A. San Jose State College, 1966; J.D. University of Santa Clara,
1969; LL.M. George Washington University, 1971; Member of Supreme
Court, California, and District of Columbia Bars; Chief Trial Attorney,
Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, California.
1. Bush v. United States, 375 F.2d 602, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The quote
by Chief Justice Burger was made prior to his elevation to the Supreme
Court when he served on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
2. Grano, A Dilemma For Defense Counsel: Spinnelli-Harris Search
Warrants and the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 Umv. IL. LAw Foaum
405, 409 (1971).
July 1974 Vol. II

No. 4

general public. The exact amount of police perjury in criminal
proceedings is difficult to measure, but there can be no question
that it exists. In certain instances, such as in suppression of evidence hearings where the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment
are a factor, policemen show a high propensity to purposely distort
their testimony in order to achieve desired ends.
Intertwined with the phenomena of police perjury is the propriety of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. The rule has been
the focus of much hot debate since Mapp v. Ohio3 made it applicable to the States. The policeman, cognizant of the fact that a
violation of the rules of search and seizure may result in his case
being thrown out of court, is not adverse to fabricating testimony
as to the method by which his search was conducted in order to
save the case. That such a drastic result-the suppression of otherwise competent evidence-should derive from a policeman's failure
to conform his conduct to complex search and seizure rules is the
foundation of the hostility of the exclusionary rule. Indeed, Chief
Justice Burger has decried "the monstrous price we pay for the
exclusionary rule ' 4 and has written at length lambasting the rule
as a "wistful dream." 5 Several other Supreme Court justices, present and past, agree that the Fourth Amendment does not mandate
an exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence and have joined
in raising the hue-and-cry for substitutes to the exclusionary rule.6
This article examines the legitimacy of the criticism of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. In doing so, a general theme will
3. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

4. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 493 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
5. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
6. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), Justices Harlan,
Black, Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger dissented and indicated their
readiness to abandon the exclusionary rule's application to the States. In
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973), Justice Powell indicated his own reservations with the exclusionary rule in arguing that federal habeas corpus claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 should not be a means

to review Fourth Amendment claims of state prisoners. Cf., Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 271 (1969). Justice Rehnquist has indicated his
distaste for the exclusionary rule in authoring important decisions significantly curtailing its application. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). Chief Justice Burger, how-

ever, has also stated that he "would hesitate to abandon it until some

meaningful substitute is developed, ..... .Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971). In
this, he probably speaks for Justices Powell and Blackmun as well. Cf.,
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 365 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting,
expresses a fear that a majority on the Court is now ready to jettison the
rule entirely.).
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emerge: the exclusionary rule is a benevolent concept crippled by
police perjury and judicial hostility and seen as deserving a mercy
killing by those who never wanted to give it life. It is the intent
of this article to explore the extent to which police perjury and
judicial hostility have crippled the purpose and effect of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. The conclusion will provide suggestions which, if implemented, could breathe new life into a beleaguered Fourth Amendment.
I.

ExcLusioxARY RuLE CRITICISM IN A NUTSHELL

The critics of the exclusionary rule have been many and vocal.
Countless articles have been written by the rule's detractors claiming it to be ineffective in its purpose of deterring police misconduct and preserving the integrity of the courtroom.7 While this
paper is not intended to be a comprehensive exposition of all aspects of the rule's criticism, the major focuses of attack may be
summarized as follows:

First, it cannot be effective unless illegally obtained evidence is
needed by the state to convict the defendant and this will not be
the case when improper police conduct does not result in state acquisition or when the State has other evidence sufficient to convict. Second, many procedural obstacles exist to limit the frequency of invocation of the rule. If the appropriate motion is not

made at the appropriate time, the issues may escape formal litiga-

tion. Given the predominance of the guilty plea system in all jurisdictions, it is likely that most questions on police illegality become only additional factors in the bargaining process. The defendant must also have satisfied 'standing' requirements to move
to suppress. Third, indirect uses may still be made on illegally
obtained evidence, such as by introduction at trial of that evidence
to impeach the defendant; and, the so called 'fruits' doctrine cannot
prevent all indirect benefit to the police.
7. A partial listing of the commentators who stress this and other criticisms of the rule includes: Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14
Amvi. U. L. REV. 1 (1964); Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake,
19 DEPAuL L. REy. 80 (1969); Cox, The Decline of the Exclusionary Rule:
An Alternative to Injustice, 4 SOUTHWESTN U.L. REV. 68 (1972); Friendly,
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAI". L. REV. 929
(1965); Horowitz, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule-Can There Be an Effective Alternative, 47 L.A. B. BULL. 91 (1972); La Fave & Remington,
Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law
Enforcement Decisions, 63 DICH. L. REV. 987 (1965); Oakes, Studyng the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. RaV. 665 (1970);
Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 MxcH. L. REv. 169 (1955); Wright,
Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEXAS L. REV.
736 (1972).

Finally-and this is the main problem-the exclusionary rule derives whatever efficacy it may have from the underlying assumption that when the police engage in illegal conduct, it is for the
purpose of securing a conviction. The fallacy in this assumption
has been amply documented. It should be hoped that the Court's
explicit recognition of this limitation in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968), will contribute to increase the tension to that 'protean
variety' of police-citizen confrontations which do not contemplate
prosecution. 8
Critics also complain that there is no empirical evidence proving
the deterrent effect of the rule on police conduct. The result, so the
disputants argue, is that the rule has had an adverse effect
upon law enforcement in the United States because competent, relevant evidence is many times excluded merely because of an inadvertent error by a policeman not schooled in the intricacies and
vicissitudes of Fourth Amendment appellate rulings. Further, the
penalty for an unlawful search is not imposed directly upon the
transgressing officer, but rather on society which pays the price as
the accused walks out of court a free man.9 Thus, nothing is done
to mend the erring ways of the offending officer and society is prevented its day in court with the accused.
In reflecting upon this criticism, the primary purposes of the
exclusionary rule should be recalled. The basic premise underly8. Tiffany, The Fourth Amendment and Police Citizen Confrontations,
60 J. Cnmv. L.C. & P.S. 442, 452 (1969). The author's last quoted reference
concerns the serious issue of arrests by police merely to harrass individuals in so-called "sumptuary crimes;" e.g., "cleaning up" skid row by arresting alcoholics. See also R. NnvmER, Two MILLIoN UN 'ECESSARY ARRESTS (1971).
9. Former California Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Traynor
viewed the effect of the rule in quite different terms:
[Tjhe guilty go free if the evidence necessary to convict could
only have been obtained illegally, just as they would go free if
such evidence were lacking because the police had observed the
constitutional restraints upon them. It is seriously misleading,
however, to suggest that wholesale release of the guilty is a consequence of the exclusionary rule. It is a large assumption that the
police have invariably exhausted the possibilities of obtaining evidence legally when they have relied upon illegally obtained evidence. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large In The Fifty States, 1962
DUKE L.J. 319, 322 (1962).
But compare Dean Wigmore's argument that the "always watchful forces
of criminality, fraud, anarchy and law evasion perceived the advantage
of [the exclusionary rule] and made vigorous use of it." 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE, § 2184a, n.1 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Wigmore's contention that
criminals are avidly reading appellate slip sheets to utilize the latest Fourth
Amendment rulings as a crime tool is fanciful, but one with some following. One adherent reiterates the proposition by blaming defense attorneys
for "... hiding their clients from justice and retribution in the nooks and
crannies of Constitutional law, leaving them free to return to their antisocial careers." See McGA~un, THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: AN ILL CONCEIVED
AND INEFFECTIVE REMEDY, POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM

Sowle, Ed. 1962).

99 (C.R.
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ing the exclusionary rule is that in a free society, government
should not resort to illegal tactics in order to prosecute its citizens
for wrongdoing. "If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it
breeds contempt for law," said Justice Brandeis, "Lilt invites an0
archy." o
To discourage governmental crime in the course of criminal investigations and prosecutions, the Supreme Court determined long
ago that a rule excluding illegally obtained evidence would be necessary to preserve judicial integrity. The Court stated that trial
courts "[c] annot and will not be made party to lawless invasions
of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.""
To implement these policy considerations and to breathe life into
the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court in
3
United States v. Boyd,' 2 Weeks v. United States, and Mapp v.
Ohio,'4 determined that illegally obtained evidence could not be
constitutionally received in federal or state courts in furtherance
of a criminal prosecution. The evidence is excluded, not because
it is unreliable,' 5 but because the values embodied in the Fourth
Amendment are of greater import to the health of a democratic
society than the use of that evidence in obtaining a criminal conviction. Thus, the government's legitimate interest in investigating
10. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
11. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968). In preserving its own integrity,
the judiciary fashioned the exclusionary rule to exclude unconstitutionally
obtained evidence and thus "deter the lawless action of the police." See
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
12. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd is the progenitor of the exclusionary rule.
The case involved a delicate interplay between the exclusionary rules of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and Justice Brandeis carried the case
to the extent that:
To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.
Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
472 (1928).
This rationale has not been adopted in subsequent cases.
13. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
14. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15. As are coerced confessions, see, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199 (1960), or overly-suggestive line-ups, see, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967).

crimes and prosecuting the wrongdoer is balanced against the individual's right to be free from warrantless and arbitrary invasions
of privacy by governmental agents. This balance was struck, not
by nine men sitting on the Supreme Court in the early 20th century, but by the draftsmen of the Fourth Amendment. The government may fulfill its valid interest in ferreting out crime merely
by heeding the words of the Constitution and conducting its
searches and seizures after securing advance authorization by a
neutral magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. The individual's right to privacy is also fulfilled in the knowledge that arbitrary and harrassing governmental invasions will not be tolerated
by the courts. 16
The implementation of the Fourth Amendment by means of an
exclusionary rule has brought on the avalanche of hostile criticism.
In pressing the case for partial or total abandonment of the rule,
the critics claim that the exclusionary rule has been a failure in
17
deterring police wrongdoing in the area of search and seizure.
The detractors are prepared to strike a new balance's within the
Fourth Amendment, one which would make the American courtroom a forum in which police crime and misconduct becomes a
means by which the citizenry is prosecuted. Within this new
framework, alternative remedies allegedly will succeed where the
exclusionary rule has failed. The proposed alternatives are examined below.
16. See Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 74 (9th Cir. 1973) where Judge

Hufstedler, dissenting, eloquently captures the point:
Of course, the government has a great and legitimate interest in
detecting and preventing crime, but that interest must be balanced
against the individual's right to be free from unjustified intrusions.
The balance was struck by the draftsmen of the Fourth Amendment: the governmental interest in combating crime is fully accommodated by permitting all searches and seizures, subject only

to advance authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause; and the individual's expectations of privacy are protected by the knowledge that warrantless intrusions into his life
will not be tolerated.
17. Lest the reader think the exclusionary rule has no supporters, read
the following works in support of a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule:
M. PAULSEN, THE EXCLUSIONARY RuLE ANDM iscoNDucT BY THE PoLIcE IN
[Hereinafter cited as
PoIrcE POWEa AM INDIVMUAL FREEDOM, 87 (1962).
PAULSEN, THE EXcLUSIONARY RULE].
Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-

Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CoRNELL. L.Q. 436 (1964);
Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CarM.

L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961).

18. Balancing is just the course taken by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) where Justice Powell, writing for

the Court, found the necessity for orderly Grand Jury proceedings to out-

weigh the necessity of allowing a witness to invoke the exclusionary rule
in such a proceeding.
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II.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE

A.

Civil Remedies

Legislators, judges, law professors, prosecutors, and police administrators have each proposed alternatives to replace the exclusionary rule in whole or in part. Chief Justice Burger's proposal
raised in his dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents0
calls for a legislatively-created administrative or quasi-judicial
remedy against the Government. The victim of a Fourth Amendment violation by the Government would be compensated by an
award of money damages. The proposal would include: a) a
waiver of sovereign immunity so that the Government might be
sued; b) the creation of a cause of action (a federal tort claim)
for damages sustained by the person aggrieved; c) the creation of
a quasi-judicial tribunal to adjudicate the claims; d) a statutory
provision indicating that the remedy is in lieu of the exclusion
of evidence secured for use in criminal cases in violation of the
Fourth Amendment; and e) a provision directing the abolishment
of the exclusionary rule from criminal proceedings.2 0 Justice Bur22
2
ger's proposal has been embodied in proposed federal ' and state
legislation.
The Burger alternative to the exclusionary rule is legislation
which would enhance the common law tort remedy; it represents
a realization that the current common law tort remedy against police officers has been an utter failure in compensating victims and
deterring further police misconduct. The existing procedural and
substantive hurdles for the plaintiff-victim of illegal police
searches have been so great as to preclude relief for the victim
or deter the wrongdoing policeman. In spite of this recognition,
19. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
20. Id. at 422-23.
21. A bill introduced by Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas to amend the
United States Code with a modification of the exclusionary rule, S. 881,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) is discussed at 11-16 infra.
22. California Senate Bill 1153, introduced in the 1973 Legislative Session by Senator Robert Lagomarsino, would abolish the exclusionary rule
in California, and would replace it with a statutory remedy as suggested
by a committee appointed by Governor Reagan. See, CONTROLLING CIMvE
IN CATIFoRNiA, REPoRT or THE GoVERNoR's SELECT COmr
oN LAW ENFoRcEmENT PROBLEms, 17-18 (Aug. 1973).

however, the same defects which are inherent in the present tort
remedy also exist in the Burger proposal. For example, just as
judge and jury sympathies historically have not been directed toward rewarding individuals who have been the focus of criminal
investigation, absent a change in human nature,2 3 the same will
be true of the judicial officer hearing the claim of the victim. This
would be especially true after the plaintiff had been convicted in
the criminal courts with the illegally obtained evidence. The demonstration of actual damages to the plaintiff-victim will be especially difficult since the illegality of the police officer's action
usually will not result in major demonstrable injury to property
or the person. Further, the defense of police justification because
of the officer's good faith belief in the legality of the search is
a complete bar to common law or statutory tort recovery.24 No
court review would exist in the criminal proceedings and, in the
rare event of a civil suit, the officer's testimony as to his subjective intent in conducting the search will defeat the victim's claim.
As a deterrent to police misconduct, in the absence of an exclusionary rule, the civil remedy would pose no threat to officers bent
on violating a citizen's right to privacy.
Reliance on a civil remedy, be it in tort or of the Burger proposal variety, ignores the problem of long delays on the civil calendars in the courts.25 The civil remedy will hardly be a deter23. Professor Dallin Oaks, supra note 7 at 673, states: "[fluries will
be unwilling to find significant damages against police officers, especially
in favor of a plaintiff who was an accused or convicted criminal."
24. See, e.g., Williams v. Gould, 486 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1973) [Suit under
42 U.S.C. 1983 (Federal Civil Rights Act) for warrantless invasion by police officer of apartment; held that good faith of officer is an available
defense.] In reversing the trial court, the circuit court held:
We comment on the merits of the defense in only one respect.
Because the defense rests on good faith and reasonable belief, Officer Gould need not, in order to establish the defense, prevail on
the legal position that a warrant is not required to enter a home
to arrest a felon. Whether a warrant is required in such a situation is an open constitutional issue. It divides the Supreme Court.
Williams v. Gould, supra, at 548. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 476-82 (1972). Either view as to its ultimate
resolution might be entertained reasonably and in good faith.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire supra at 548.
Although the Second Circuit held that federal police officers and agents
have no immunity from suits charging violation of constitutional rights,
[Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347 (2d Cir. 1972) ]
the officer need not prove probable cause to establish a defense. He must
only show that he acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief in
the validity of the arrest and search. Id. at 1348. Cf., Abramson v.
Mitchell, 459 F.2d 955, 957 (8th Cir. 1972) (good faith reliance on court
order to intercept wire or oral communications is not an absolute defense
to civil suit).
25. Of the 100,453 federal civil cases pending as of December 31, 1972,
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rent to police misconduct if the case is tried years after the alleged illegality occurred. In this respect, it should be noted that
the Burger proposal would have the effect of bifurcating litigation
and doubling the caseload in the courts. Now, in addition to the
criminal proceeding, there would be a civil suit by the criminal
defendant against the police officer. This would prove a costly,
time-consuming duplication of litigation. If the Burger proposal
were to prove more than a paper remedy, there would be of necessity a right to counsel guarantee so that the victim might pursue the legislatively-created civil remedy for unlawful search and
seizure. Thus, the beleaguered taxpayer would not only foot the
26
bill for an indigent's representation in criminal cases, but would
also pay for the services of a second attorney who would explore
the civil remedy in the separate tribunal created for that purpose.
The common law tort remedy for illegal police action against
the citizenry already established itself, by the time of the Mapp
ruling, as a failure both in deterring police misconduct and in ade27
One reason for the failure of
quately compensating the victim.
the civil remedy is that individuals victimized by illegal searches
by the police have refrained from civilly suing for fear of risking
further harassment. The Burger alternative would not differ from
in all federal district courts, exclusive of land condemnation cases, over
forty-two percent had been pending over one year. See SEMv-ANNUAL REPORT or TE DIRECTOR, ADMnISTRATVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
19 (1973).
26. As constitutionally guaranteed by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Currently, federal courts have the authority to appoint counsel to represent indigent
plaintiffs suing under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915. However, Congress has not authorized funds to pay counsel for this representation.
27. Commentators prior to Mapp dismissed the civil remedy as "[a]
supplementary method to provide damages for the few. . . ." Comment,
Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of the Constitutional Right of
Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493, 503 (1952). See also Spiotto, Search and
Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives,
2 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES, 243, 272 (1973) where the author concludes:
From our statistical study of the manner in which police search,
it can be seen that very often physical damage to property is not
great, and the fact that police officers are the representatives of
society and normally act in its interests probably causes many juries to hesitate before granting an award.
Even if a civil award against a policeman-defendant were granted, there
is no assurance that this would have an effect on departmental policies
which are violative of the Fourth Amendment.

the present remedies in this respect. Such fears may have their
origin in experience or neighborhood hearsay, but they are generally coupled with a hopeless belief that the courts will not support their claims with judgments against police officers. Civil
remedies have failed to deter police misconduct because even if
the victim sues the policeman, obtains appointed or retained counsel to press the claim, waits the requisite period of time for the
case to be heard, and then wins the case and receives a judgment
for damages, the wrongdoing policeman is many times so impoverished as to be judgment-proof or so solvent as to have an insurance
company pay the bill. Under the civil remedy, there has been no
deterrence of police misconduct because the only penalty to the
wrongdoer (in the rare event of a judgment against him) has
been an unenforceable judgment or a slight increase on an insurance premium.28 It should be noted that the Burger alternative
provides even less of a deterrent possibility since the Government,
not the officer, is the defendant and payor of any damages
awarded.
Let us assume, however, that the above enumerated obstacles
to the deterrent effect of a civil remedy are removed: the calendars of the appropriate tribunal are not congested and are reasonably accessible to resolve the dispute; the indigent plaintiff-victim
has appointed counsel who is adequately compensated and prepared to effectively represent the client's interest; the trier of fact
is willing, on a valid claim, to award substantial damages to the
plaintiff-victim even though he has been convicted of criminal
charges by the tainted evidence derived from the illegal search;
and the defendant-police officer is not so poor as to be judgmentproof or not insured so as to obviate the deterrent impact of the
proceeding. Would this hypothetical civil remedy truly exist independent of the criminal proceeding to have a deterrent impact on
the offending officer? In an age where plea bargaining is the
means by which the vast majority of criminal cases are terminated,2 it is reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's antici28. The threat of false-arrest suit is one aspect of the uncertainty for
which the policeman has found some recourse. Some are taking out insurance from Lloyd's of London. One policeman stated:
By the way, I am taking out insurance by Lloyd's of London
against the false-arrest suits. It's six dollars in the beginning and
then three dollars a year and they protect you up to five thousand
dollars. That will take a weight off my mind. The only trouble
is that they don't protect you against assault charges. RucmnsmN, WHO RuLEs THE PocE, 98 (1973).
29. See AzoCnA BAR AssociATioN PRoJECT ON STANDARDs FOR CPnVYINAL
JUsTIcE, THE PROSEcuTIoN FuNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FuNcTION, § 5.3,

at 244 (1971).

"Since the overwhelming percentage of criminal cases in
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pated civil suit against an offending police officer would be considered in the plea negotiations. A bargain in which the defendant
agrees not to pursue the hypothetically effective civil remedy in
return for favorable treatment in the criminal prosecution is certain to be struck. It would be a bargain founded on mutual selfinterest and pragmatism. Ultimately, it would be a corruptive contract in which two wrongdoers benefit each other at society's ex30
pense.
The basic defect in the concept of a civil remedy alternative to
the exclusionary rule, either the common law tort or the Burger
proposal, is that such remedies have failed to prove effective in
either compensating the victim or deterring the transgressor. It
is fanciful to believe that abolishing the exclusionary rule and replacing it with a civil remedy would magically transform the latter
into an effective deterrent against police misconduct. In light of
the almost unanimous agreement that civil remedies are little more
than paper remedies, 31 one ponders the sincerity which the proponents bring to the issue. Is it possible that hostility to the exclusionary rule has obsessed its detractors to the point where any
substitute, no matter how ineffectual, is touted as an acceptable
alternative? Before alternatives can be seriously considered, their
effectiveness in practice must be clearly proven. Experience demall state and federal courts, something on the order of 90 percent, are disposed of by pleas of guilty . . . the exclusionary rule does not affect the
vast majority of criminal cases that reach the trial court."
30. In a criminal justice system where plea bargaining plays a preeminent role, it takes very little imagination to perceive that if
the remedy is an effective one, the remedy will enter into negotiation. If there has been an arguable violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the officer's self-interest would be served by obtaining some kind of an agreement out of the accused that he not
pursue the tort remedy in return for the lowering of the charge
or dismissal of the complaint. This would, in turn, encourage
over-charging of offenses to give the officer as much maneuverability as possible in these negotiations. The practical result of
the theoretical idea of benefiting those individuals whose rights
have been violated-the further corruption of the system with contempt for the police, courts, and all involved felt by those who
are brought into the system. The further loss of respect for our
institutions by those in the society with whom it comes in contact would exacerbate the problems facing criminal law today.
Brief for California Public Defenders Association as Amicus Curiae reprinted in Law Reprints, Vol. 4 n.10, 304-05 (1972-73) California v. Krivda,
409 U.S. 33 (1973).
31. See Oaks, supra note 7, at 673 where the author comments on the
futility of existing remedies to deter police misconduct.

onstrates the futility of a civil remedy alternative to the exclusionary rule. In fact, discussion of alternatives to the exclusionary
rule is deceptive. "Their statement conveys the impression that
one possibility is as effective as the next. For there is but one
alternative to the rule of exclusion.
That is no sanction at
all .... "M2
B.

Criminal,Injunctive, and Contempt Remedies

Little need be said about the effectiveness of criminal sanctions
against offending officers as an alternative to the exclusionary
rule. Such remedies have existed alongside the exclusionary rule
without any apparent deterrence of police misconduct. An examination of the federal statutes 33 which prohibit warrantless, causeless searches of buildings and property reveals that there have
been virtually no prosecutions. The reason is simple. Prosecutors
34
will not prosecute police officers and juries will not convict them.
Further, criminal sanctions, even if implemented to the extent that
they had some deterrent effect on the police, would not satisfy
the requirement preserving judicial integrity. 35 As with the ex32. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Former Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court in People
v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 447 (1955) stated the problem in similar terms:
"Experience has demonstrated, however, that neither administrative, criminal, nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing lawless searches and
seizures .... "
33. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2235, 2236 (1970). Both statutes prohibit malicious searches without probable cause or warrants for searches of dwellings. One group of researchers could find no reported prosecutions for
police misconduct between 1956 and 1969:
We have been unable to unearth any additional reported cases for
the subsequent 13 years. No authoritative explanation has been
given for the absence of prosecution for police offenses, but the
reasons are not difficult to surmise. Prosecutors are probably reluctant to enforce these dormant criminal sanctions against police
offenses because they anticipate, in our view correctly, a detrimental effect on law enforcement which is the goal of both departments, and because they consider the punishment too harsh.
LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED, REPORT or THE TASK FORCE ON LAW AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT TO THE NATIONAL CO1VMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, 382 (1969) [Hereinafter cited as LAw Am ORDER RECONSIDERED]. As of 1960, less than half the States had punitive sanctions
against police invasions of the right to privacy. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 652 n.7 (1960).
34. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PRoJEcT ON STANDARDS FOR CRImNAL
JUSTICE, THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION, § 5.3, at 152 (Approved Draft, 1973)
[Hereinafter cited as URBAN POLICE FUNCTION].

35. The Supreme Court has stated the policy foundation for the exclusionary rule as the "imperative of judicial integrity." Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). According to Justice Holmes, a conviction
based upon illegally seized evidence makes the prosecution and judiciary
abettors to the policeman's misconduct:
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ample of civil suit remedies against police officers, since the presently existing criminal remedies against wrongdoing police officers
have failed to deter further police misconduct there is no reason
to believe that abandoning the exclusionary rule would make the
sanctions more potent.
Injunctive relief has proven to be a valuable tool with clearly
predictable patterns of illegal police conduct against an identifiable
plaintiff. Thus, where the police have conducted repeated sweeps
of neighborhoods, searching homes without warrants based on
anonymous tips, the courts have granted injunctions to prevent
repeated violations. 36 Since the injunction is only useful under
circumstances in which past and repeated police misconduct have
demonstrated a likelihood of repetition in the future, it would have
no impact on deterring common violations that occur in the more
ordinary unpredictable police investigations.
Dean Wigmore once suggested that the criminal contempt sanction be used in place of the exclusionary rule:
The natural way to do justice here would be to enforce the
healthy principle of the Fourth Amendment directly, i.e., by sending for the high-handed, overzealous marshal who had searched
without a warrant, imposing a thirty day imprisonment for his
contempt of the Constitution, and then proceeding to affirm the
sentence of the convicted criminal.37
Without an exclusionary rule and the attendant motion to suppress hearing, it is difficult to perceive how the judiciary would,
[N]o distinction can be made between the Government as prosecutor and the Government as judge. If the existing [criminal]
code does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such
dirty business it does not permit the judge to allow such inequities to succeed. Olmstead v. United States, 377 U.S. 438, 470
(1928) (dissenting opinion).
36. In Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) the police had
conducted over 300 searches of homes over a 19-day period without warrants and based upon anonymous tips. An injunction was granted, the
Circuit Court holding:
There can be little doubt that actions for money damages would
not suffice to repair the injury suffered by the victims of police
searches. ...
[T]he wrongs inflicted are not readily measurable
in terms of dollars and cents. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself
has already declared that the prospect of pecuniary redress for
the harm suffered is 'worthless and futile'. Moreover, the lesson
of experience is that the remote possibility of money damages
serves as no deterrent to future police invasions. Id. at 202.
See also URBAN PoLIcE FUNCTION, supra note 34, § 5.3, at 152.
37. 8 WIGMoRE, EviDENCE, § 2184 (3d ed. 1940).

of its own motion, discover the instances of illegal police searches
and then hold the officer in contempt.38 Even if this posed no
problem, it is unlikely that a judiciary with a general reluctance
to find police action illegal in motion to suppress hearings would
do so when such a finding necessitates criminal sanctions against
the transgressing officer. Such a prospect would raise further problems since the officer would be entitled to a separate jury trial
on the issue.3 9
All of the alternative proposals to replace the exclusionary rule
not only suffer from many of the defects currently plaguing it
but have attendant problems 40 of their own and offer little prospect of either deterring further police misconduct, compensating
the victim, or preserving the integrity of the courtroom. In any
case, almost all of the proposed alternatives currently exist as potential supplements to the rule. Their past failure as supplements
to the rule indicates the futility of their role, either separately
or in combination, as a replacement.
C. The Substantial Violation Test: The Bentsen Bill
The most seriously considered of the proposed alternatives to the
exclusionary rule is that of the "substantial violation" test. This
proposal would vest in the trial courts discretion whether or not
38. This is the great advantage of the exclusionary rule in criminal pro-

ceedings. Motions to suppress evidence are brought by the defendant prior
to trial giving the court an opportunity to review the officer's action. Oaks,
supra note 7, at 756, states: "The advantage of the exclusionary ruleentirely apart from any direct deterrent effect-is that it provides an occasion for judicial review [of alleged violations of constitutional rights] and
it gives credibility to the constitutional guarantees."
39. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
40. Much of the problem of police privacy violations could be alleviated
with better internal police review. However, most "[c]ommentators believe that internal police disciplinary actions are incapable of dealing with
police violation of constitutional guarantees." Spiotto, supra note 27 at
277. This conclusion derives from a reluctance of old-line police chiefs
to obey the courts' strictures in the Fourth Amendment area. Dr. Egon
Bittner quotes several former big city police administrators who condoned
lawless conduct by police officers in order to achieve desired ends.
Thus, Superintendent Wilson of Chicago declared, 'If we follow
some of our court decisions literally, the public would be demanding my removal as Supertindent of Police and-I might add-with
justification.' Chief Parker of Los Angeles has taken the view that,
'It is anticipated that the police will ignore these legal limitations
when the immediate public welfare appears to demand police lawlessness.' And Chief Schrotel of Cincinnati has stated the dilemma
of the policeman in these terms: 'Either he abides by the prescribed rules and renders ineffective service, or he violates or circumvents the rules and performs the service required of him.'

E. BITTNn, THE
(1973).

FUxcTiONs OF THE POLICE IN MODEMN SOCIsTY, 28-29, n.46
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to admit the evidence allegedly the product of an illegal search
and seizure. Evidence would only be excluded by the trial court
where a "substantial" Fourth Amendment violation was committed
by the governmental agent, as opposed to automatic exclusion under the current rule. The substantial violation alternative to the
exclusionary rule has been presented before Congress in the form
of the Bentsen Bill 41 and, if enacted, would amend the United
States Criminal Code by adding a new section 42 to redefine and
limit the exclusionary rule:
"Evidence shall not be excluded from any federal criminal proceeding solely because that evidence was obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment of the Constitution, unless the 43court finds,
as a matter of law, that such violation was substantial."
In determining whether a violation is substantial, the Bentsen

Bill offers several guidelines which a trial court is to consider in
passing on the seriousness of the violation. These considerations
would include: the extent of the deviation from sanctioned conduct, the extent of willfulness by the officer, the extent to which
privacy was invaded, the extent to which exclusion would prevent
similar violations, whether the evidence seized would have been
discovered if the violation had not occurred, 44 and the degree to
which the violation prejudiced the defendant's ability to defend
himself in the proceeding in which the seized items are offered
in evidence.
The second section of the Bentsen Bill provides for an amendment to the Federal Torts Claims Act along the lines proposed
by Chief Justice Burger in Bivens.4 5 The amendment would provide a tort cause of action against the United States for illegal
searches and seizures conducted in violation of the Constitution
by any employee of the federal government. The proposed act al41. See Bentsen Bill, S. 881, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which adopts
the suggested rule of the American Law Institute proposing that only
where a "substantial violation" of Fourth Amendment rights takes place
should the courts impose the death penalty to the evidence. See ALI
MODEL CODE OF PEE-AmAIGNMENT PRoCEDURE - 8.02(2) (Tent. Draft No.

4, 1971).

The American Bar Association voted to oppose the adoption of

the Bentsen Bill in February 1973.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3505.
Id. at § (b).
Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3504.
Proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2691.

12 CRL 1077 (Feb. 21, 1973).

lows for compensatory and punitive damages, but no award or settlement of the civil action brought under the proposed section may
exceed $25,000. Any recovery under the Act is a bar against other
plaintiff-victim may
civil actions and attorneys representing the
46
not receive in excess of 25% of the recovery.
The constitutionality of such a statute is open to question 7 and
its impact on police conduct is doubtful. 48 The exclusionary rule
has been criticized because policemen cannot be expected to follow
the complexity of search and seizure law. The modern police officer, however, realizes that a search and seizure found to be violative of these rules should result in certain exclusion of evidence.
The officer also knows that if the time is taken to secure a search
49
warrant, the courts will take great pains to uphold the search.
A substantial violation test will not bring clarity to the search
and seizure rulings of the courts. Instead, an additional variable
will be added to the rulings. The courts presumably will be interpreting the same Fourth Amendment except that, under the Bentsen Bill, determining whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment has taken place is only the threshhold question. The second
question before the court will be to determine whether or not the
violation is substantial 0 and thus warrants excluding the seized
46. Id. at § (b).

47. In Weeks v. United States, 234 U.S. 383 (1914) and again in Mapp

v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme Court found the exclusionary

rule constitutionally required and implicit in the Fourth Amendment. This
legislation would in effect overrule Mapp and Weeks as well. As was
stated in Weeks v. United States, supra at 393, the Fourth Amendment
would not be worthy of inclusion in the Constitution absent the exclusionary rule. In the 60 years since the decision in Weeks, the Supreme Court
has not departed from the essential finding of that case: that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required. See Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 208, 210 (1959); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The validity
of such a statute overruling constitutional doctrine is highly questionable.
48. The per se exclusionary rule has played an important role in initiating and maintaining police training of search law in the more advanced
departments. See, e.g., Wilson & Alprin, Controlling Police Conduct: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 36 LAw & CoNTEP. PROB. 488, 49899 (1971). The advent of discretionary admissibility of tainted evidence
would create an interesting training dilemma. See note 50 infra.
49. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
50. One might ask what is a substantial violation? Will the test be simply one of the overall reasonableness of the officer's conduct in each particular case? If so, the number of pre-trial suppression hearings will certainly not diminish and the police will have at least the same problems
of predicting and understanding differing judicial interpretations of search
law. In short, the "substantial violation" test is no more than a warmedover plate of due process "shocks the conscience" rules that were rejected
in Mapp as unworkable. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
Such a due process "shock" approach was condemned by Justice Jackson
even prior to Mapp:
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evidence. With the additional variables, the police will have the
same problems of predicting and understanding differing judicial
interpretations of search law.51 More important will be the prospect of officers abusing the privacy of citizens confident that a
sympathetic local judge will find the violation of the defendant's
rights "insubstantial." In effect, the extent of the individual's
right of privacy will be determined by the police officer's good
faith. For if the standard will be that of the reasonableness of
the officer's decision (certainly a reasonable action by the officer
will not be deemed a substantial violation of the Fourth Amendment), then evidence produced by illegal means will become admissible and in a sense legal merely because the officer subjectively
believed his conduct reasonable and the conduct did not objectively
shock the conscience of the court.
If the courts will have trouble recognizing and articulating a substantial violation warranting exclusion of evidence, questions will
arise as to uniformity in administering the proposed standard. It
is no secret that some of the judiciary is openly hostile to the exclusionary rule.52 Trial courts with a negative attitude toward the
exclusionary rule will simply use the new substantial violation criWe are urged to make inroads upon Wolf by holding that it applies only to searches and seizures which produce on our minds
a mild shock, while if the shock is more serious, the states must
exclude the evidence or we will reverse the conviction. ... [Such]
a distinction of the kind urged would leave the rule so indefinite
that no state court could know .what it should rule in order to
keep its processes on solid constitutional ground. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1954).
51. Chief Justice Burger has noted the differing judicial concepts of reasonableness:
Policemen do not have the time, inclination, or training to read
and grasp the nuances of the appellate opinions that ultimately
define the standards of conduct they are to follow. The issues
that these decisions resolve often admit of neither easy nor obvious
answers, as sharply divided courts on what is or is not 'reasonable' amply demonstrate. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 417 (1971).
A new substantial violation test will prove no easier for the courts to interpret or the policeman to comprehend. However, the ability of the police
to grasp legal concepts should not be underestimated. During hearings
on motions to suppress evidence based on alleged illegal search and seizure, some have demonstrated an uncanny ability to shape their testimony
to the latest appellate notions of reasonableness. See Section IV infra.
52. According to Judge Hufstedler, dissenting in Holmes v. Burr, 486
F.2d 55, at 74 (9th Cir. 1973) "[H]ostility to the exclusionary rule permeates opinion after opinion commencing with Olmstead."

teria as a facile bootstrap to admit tainted evidence. Judges of
a more liberal orientation will be more reluctant to find constitutional violations insubstantial and will continue to suppress illegally obtained evidence. Thus, justice will vary according to the
differing philosophies of the trial courts to a greater degree than
it does today.
Ostensibly, the provision in the Bentsen Bill for relief5 3 against
the government is to provide a deterrent against future misconduct by the police. Four factors point toward an opposite conclusion: the officer is not a defendant and thus not directly affected
by the outcome; the government, not the officer, pays the award
to the victim; bringing such a suit bars the victim from suing the
officer directly, thus providing the officer a statutory immunity;
and finally, the admissibility of illegally seized evidence in the
criminal proceedings, in light of the officer's statutory immunity,
will encourage more aggressive police investigations and undoubtedly more Fourth Amendment violations.
The failure of the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct
has yet to be proven. Detractors of the rule claim that the exclusionary rule is supported only by "recourse to polemic, rhetoric,
and intuition,"5 4 but the same may be said of the opponents of
the rule who advocate the Bentsen Bill alternative. There is no
empirical substantiation of claims that the rule is not a deterrent. 55
The detractors put forth an alternative, a statutory tort claim for
the victim, which is likely to duplicate the failure of existing remedies to deter police misconduct or reimburse the victim. Additionally, there can be no question that judicial integrity would be demeaned under a substantial violation test in that the courtroom
would now be the forum for evidence obtained illegally by the
53. The realism brought to this problem by proponents of alternatives
to the exclusionary rule is dubious. No one can seriously contend in light
of past experience ".... that governmental units will bear any substantial
expenditure to compensate the most probable victims of illegal police misconduct-the bums, drifters, petty crooks, or big-time operators-in the
face of the pressing public need for schools, hospitals, roads, and yes, prisons. Until some governmental unit somewhere is in fact giving adequate
civil recovery for unconstitutional law enforcement, I retain my stubborn
doubt whether the idea can be made to work." PAuLSFN, THn ExcLusIoNAnY RULE, supra note 17, at 94.
54. Oaks, supra note 7, at 755.
55. The exhaustive study conducted by Professor Oaks concludes there
are no conclusive findings demonstrating a lack of the deterrence value
of the rule.
The foregoing findings represent the largest fund of information
yet assembled on the effect of the exclusionary rule, but they obviously fall short of an empirical substantiation or refutation of
the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 709.

[voL. 11: 839, 1974]

Exclusionary Rule
SAN DIEGO LAW R.EVIEW

government (albeit by an "insubstantial" violation of the Fourth
Amendment). The court, in effect, would ratify the illegal police
conduct. The price to be paid for taking part in such activity is
not measurable statistically; however, the impact of the judiciary
bestowing its approval on illegal police action will not speak well
for the credibility of the courts.
The threat to the integrity of the judicial process in abolishing
the exclusionary rule is no small matter. "Crime is contagious,"
wrote Justice Brandeis, and if the government becomes a lawbreaker, it "breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself." 56 The relationship between lawlessness and the exclusionary rule has not been lost on court analysts.
Defendants who believe their rights infringed by government
agents are allowed, under current procedures, to litigate the issue
like private attorney generals and air the grievance before the
court. As reported by a task force to the National Commission
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence:
A final point about the exclusionary rule and its relation to violence: we may guess that the urge to destructive behavior is
greatest when the actor is moved by a sense of frustration
grounded in a feeling of injustice which he is unable to combat.
The exclusionary rule, however, provides an outlet within the law
for frustration stemming from the belief that the defendant has
been treated unjustly by the police. By a motion to suppress the
defendant can in effect strike back at authority in the very proceeding which is aimed at convicting him.57
The admission of constitutionally tainted evidence places a judicial
imprimatur on the conduct which produced it. The appearance
but in reality
would be one of granting "[t]he right of [privacy,]
55
withhold[ing] its privilege and enjoyment."
...
In sum, the Bentsen Bill and other proposed statutory alternatives to the exclusionary rule suffer from many of the same defects
inherent in the exclusionary rule. What is important to note is
that the alternatives, like the rule itself, recognize the necessity
56. Olmstead v. United States, 377 U.S. 438, 485 (1928). This basic recognition was reiterated in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961):
The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him
free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.
57. LAW AND ORDER REcONsIDERED, supra note 33, at 370.
58. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).

for safeguarding the constitutional right to be free from unjustified
governmental invasion of the right to privacy. The right of privacy, the "most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men,"59 is a right so precious that it would be foolish
to abruptly abandon the predominant remedy for its violation and
rely on ineffectual alternatives. Many of the exclusionary rule's
opponents recognize this and conclude that the rule should not be
abandoned in the absence of a realistic alternative remedy for conduct violating the Fourth Amendment 0
As previously suggested with respect to other alternatives to the
exclusionary rule, the most prudent approach to the problem is
to implement an effective civil remedy without modifying the rule.
Then, if the alternatives were to prove effective deterrents against
police misconduct, the deleterious aspects of the exclusionary rule
would soon be reduced. However, if the statutory remedy would
prove a failure in deterring police misconduct, at least the exclusionary rule would remain as the sole bulwark against governmental illegality.
In an age where electronic surveillance, 1 computer bank dossiers,02 and overzealous governmental agents 68 have suggested the
59. Olmstead v. United States, 377 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
60. See Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 420 (1971)
and Oaks supra note 7, at 756-57. THE NAT ONAL ADVISORY CoMMIssioN ON
CRMvNAL JusTicE STANDmns AND GOALS, REPORT oN CoURTs 106 (1973) recommends that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule be studied prior

to any modification.

61. See 1 B. ScHwARTz, RiGnTS OF THE PERsoN 248 (1968) where the author describes the frightening threat to privacy posed by technology:
The 'frightening' aspect referred to is particularly pertinent when
we consider the most recent advances in electronic surveillance.
These include parabolic microphones to pick up conversations at
a distance, ultraminiature wireless microphones no larger than a
pencil eraser, recorders so small they can be built into cigarette
lighters, as well as microwavebeam devices with a range of 1,000
feet or more and ability to penetrate through walls and other obstacles. The devices in question have either been developed or
'are on the brink of reality'.
62. The Federal Bureau of Investigation currently maintains a National
Crime Information Center now in its seventh year of operation. The NCIC
is a computerized information system established as a service to all law
enforcement agencies. As of November 1, 1973, there were 4,904,977 active
records in NCIC of which 431,767 were "criminal history records" of persons with "significant" arrests or convictions. The system averages 130,639
transactions daily. See FBI LAw ENqFORcEMENT BuLL nu, Tm NATIONAL
Canvni INFORmAT N CENTER, 8-10, 14 (January 1974). See also United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 757 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Schwartz, supra note 61, at 258 notes with regret that "in writing about
this whole area of personal privacy, one is left all too much with the feeling, referred to before, that the law is in the process of being outflanked
by technological advances."
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onslaught of an Orwellian state, it is not the time to strip the
Fourth Amendment of its only enforcement mechanism. In the
face of these and other threats to the right to privacy, the exclusionary rule is more important today than ever before:
In times not altogether unlike our own they [the framers of the
Constitution] won-by legal and constitutional means in England,
and by revolution on this continent-a right of personal security
against arbitrary intrusions by official power. If times have
changed, reducing every man's scope to do as he pleases in an
urban and industrial world, the changes have made the values
served by the Fourth Amendment more, not less, important.64
No one doubts the importance of maintaining this important constitutional right to privacy. It is the remedy for conduct violating
this right which has been the focus of dispute. As discussed below, judicial negativism toward the remedy, the exclusionary rule,
has crippled the effectiveness of the Fourth Amendment as a safeguard against governmental violations of the right to privacy.
Thus, in addition to supplementing the exclusionary rule by the
alternative remedies discussed above, it will be necessary also to
resuscitate the exclusionary rule itself in order to insure its deterrent impact.
Ill.

JUDIcIALLY ITPosED LIvITATIONS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

One inherent limitation of the exclusionary rule which detracts
from its function as a deterrent to police misconduct is its narrow
area of application. Through the use of a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence, a defendant may bring before a trial court allegations that evidence was obtained by the government by means of
an illegal search and seizure. Through the use of this motion the
judiciary is able to scrutinize police conduct toward the citizenry,
then formulate and apply rules mandated by the Fourth Amendment. The rulings of the court and the threat of the exclusion
of evidence derived from a violation of these rules are expected
63. The years 1972 and 1973 revealed criminal conspiracies in the highest
levels of government involving massive plans (some executed) for spying,
wiretapping and burglary. The course of the Watergate affair has demonstrated how easily some officials in government believe they can profit,
monetarily or politically, from flaunting the Fourth Amendment rights of
certain citizens. Against this prospect, the exclusionary rule stands to prevent governmental exploitation of such criminality in the courtroom.
64. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 445 (1971).

to control police conduct in the field. However, the suppression
hearing is in reality only a tiny hook upon which to hang such
great expectations. Since the policeman knows that the vast majority of his actions will never come under judicial scrutiny, if
the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is to have any impact
at all, there must be a degree of certainty that if the rules are
not obeyed, exclusion of evidence will result.
Two patterns have emerged to erode the deterrent impact of the
exclusionary rule. First, the courts have made it plain, in reviewing police action, that there is no certainty of exclusion when
Fourth Amendment violations by the police produce evidence. Second, the courts have steadily narrowed the area of application of
the exclusionary rule. For example, the vast majority of defendants in the criminal justice system plead guilty; those with valid
Fourth Amendment claims do not raise them and are precluded
from raising them later.65 Further, allegations of Fourth Amendment violations will not be heard before a grand jury6 or before
a judge during sentencing, or during probation or parole revocations.67
The courts have developed refined procedural hurdles which
must be overcome before a motion to suppress evidence hearing
will be successful. The defendant must have proper standing in
relationship to the allegedly tainted evidence before he may successfully challenge the legality of the search.68 The motion to suppress must be brought by the defendant within certain time limitations; the failure to comply with such will result in a waiver
65. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); cf. Mann v. Smith, 488
F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1973) [federal habeas corpus review unavailable to state
prisoner raising legality of search after guilty plea where state procedure
allows state court appellate review].
66. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
67. United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971) [parole revocation]; People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759 (1971) [Court may strip probationer
of Fourth Amendment right to refuse search of any law enforcement officer]. In United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 983 (1971) the appellate court held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and excluded during the trial was admissible for sentencing purposes. Cf. Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 529
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 925 (1970) which came to the opposite conclusion,
68. In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1968) the Supreme
Court said with respect to standing:
There is no necessity to exclude evidence against one defendant
in order to protect the rights of another. No rights of the victim
of an illegal search are at stake when the evidence is offered
against some other party.
See also Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
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of the claim. 69 Even if successful in suppressing the evidence,
should the defendant later take the stand and testify that he never
possessed the illegally obtained evidence, the government may introduce the evidence to impeach the defendant's testimony.7 0
In addition to developing procedural hurdles as condition precedents to bringing suppression motions, the courts have also narrowly restricted the area in which the Fourth Amendment has application. If the defendant is deemed to have abandoned the property seized, he has no right to challenge the legality of the search.7 1
If a private citizen conducts an illegal search resulting in evidence
turned over to the prosecution, no motion to suppress will be heard
72
since the Amendment only precludes illegal governmental action.
If the evidence is seized after being seen in plain view at a time
the governmental agent was in a place in which he had a right
to be, no right to challenge the seizure exists.7 3 Of course, if the
defendant has consented to the search by the governmental agent,
no suppression motion will succeed even if the defendant had no
knowledge of his right to refuse the consent.7 4 Any time an officer
makes a lawful custodial arrest, the right to search the person of
the arrestee is secured and a motion challenging the legality of
such a search is doomed.7 5 The courts have further narrowed the
scope of the Fourth Amendment for searches conducted at the international border,76 for numerous administrative searches, 77 and
for searches without a warrant where exigent circumstances exist.78 Further, no newly promulgated Fourth Amendment ruling
69. Valid Fourth Amendment claims may be lost to a defendant due to
incompetence of counsel; e.g., People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d
487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963), wherein the California Supreme Court found
that ineffective assistance of counsel had been rendered because counsel
was unaware of the rule of law that allowed him to challenge the legality
of a search; or as part of trial counsel's strategy in not raising the issue.
See F. BAILEY & H. ROSENBLATT, HANDLING NARcoTIc AND DRUG CASES, §
206 (1972).
70. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Brook v. United
States, 449 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1971).
71. See, e.g., Eisentrager v. Hocker, 450 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1971).
72. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
73. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).

74. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
75. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
76. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
77. E.g., United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1972).
78. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).

has ever been given retroactive effect to
nullify searches of defend79
ants convicted prior to the new holding.
Even where a motion to suppress evidence is brought in timely
fashion and exposes the search as illegal, numerous trial courts
erroneously rule the evidence admissible and place the burden on
the appellate courts to declare the evidence illegally obtained. This
is particularly true in serious cases where the pressures for convicting the defendant are great and sympathies for the latter are
lacking. The appellate courts, however, have invoked the doctrine
of "harmless error" to affirm such convictions where untainted evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.80
There is no question but that the judicial pendulum is swinging
in such a fashion as to narrow the areas in which the exclusionary
rule has application. 81 Concomitant with this trend is the risk of
steadily decreasing the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule.
Search and seizure rulings are not self-executing. If they are
not routinely enforced or applied, they will not be obeyed. Enforcement by exclusion is effective in deterring police misconduct
only where exclusion is a certainty. In serious police investigations
which are likely to give rise to prosecutions, the police are most
prone to conform their conduct to the law since such cases will
79. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) [holding Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) non-retroactive]; Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244
(1969) [holding Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) non-retroactive];
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 278 (1972) [holding Chimel v. California,
394 U.S. 752 (1969) non-retroactive].
80. See, e.g., Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684, 689-690 (9th Cir.
1965), rev'd on other grounds, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The nationwide average for federal criminal appellate reversals for fiscal
year 1971-1972 was 13.4%. Az=ArL REPORT OF TH DiREcToP, AD. OrFCE
OF TaE U.S. 11-8 (1972).
A study of Chicago practice reflected that when
the Fourth Amendment is involved the percentage of conviction affirmances
in exclusionary rule cases is much higher. When the Government appealed
cases where the lower court had ruled to exclude the evidence, the reversal
rate skyrocketed:
An examination of federal court cases reveals the same basic pattern: a small number of appeals by federal prosecutors combined
with a high percentage of reversals on appeals by the government
and a high percentage of affirmance on appeals by defendants. In
1971,
158 defendants
suppress
denied
in
the federal
courts; inappealed
92% of from
these motions
cases thetolower
federal
court
was affirmed. During that year the government appealed (pursuant tothe
18 trial
U.S.C.court
§ 3731
eightoftimes,
and in
these
appeals
was (1970))
reversedonly
in 75%
the cases.
Spiotto,
supra note 27 at 252 n.37.
81. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 365 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting):
[I] am left with the uneasy feeling that today's decision may signal that a majority of my colleagues have positioned themselves
to reopen the door still further and abandon altogether the exclusonary rule in search and seizure cases....
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undergo judicial scrutiny when a prosecution results.82 Since a
police officer usually has no way of knowing whether or not an
investigation will lead to a criminal prosecution, most sophisticated
police departments and officers follow court rulings in order to
8
insure successful prosecutions.
The circumstances under which the exclusionary rule may be
invoked are limited. Due to judicial negativism toward the rule,
the instances in which the rule is activated to exclude evidence
when warranted are also limited. If these limitations weaken the
deterrent impact of the rule on police misconduct, deterrence becomes impossible where the judiciary does not squarely administer
the rule in the context of the selected cases which come before
it. When a trial court fails to suppress demonstrably tainted evidence, it not only encourages police contempt for the judicial process and the Fourth Amendment rights of the citizenry, but it invites further violations.
The determination of the legality of a search is not always an
easy decision. The courts are interpreting complex rules with competing values pressuring for opposite results. The difficulty of determining the validity of a search is compounded by the incidents
of perjury by witnesses before the court. During suppression hearings, especially in certain classic contexts, the practice of police
perjury has been substantial. This phenomenon and its impact
upon the exclusionary rule are the subject of attention below.

IV.

RECOGNIZING Am COPING WITH

PoLicE PERJURY

If the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule is frustrated by
the rule's limited applicability, it is totally undermined when police
officers perjure themselves at suppression hearings. Criminal law
practitioners,8 4 academicians, 8 5 law enforcement advocates,88 and
82. The rule controls the police "in direct relation to the gravity of crime
of the suspect." J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, 225 (1966).
83. See note 48 supra.
84. See interview with defense attorney Martin Garbus in Police Perjury: An Interview With Martin Garbus, 8 Cnm . L. BULL 363, 364-65
(1972):
[I]n some thirteen years of practice I have handled perhaps 150
drug cases as defense counsel. I cannot recall a single case-not
one-where I was not convinced that to a greater or lesser degree
the police witness shaped his testimony.
Criminal law practitioners generally support Garbus' observation. See,

prosecutors 7 recognize that the motion to suppress hearing is a
fertile field for police perjury. The policeman
...

sees the need to be able to reconstruct a set of complex hap-

penings in such a way that, subsequent to the arrest, probable
cause can be found according to appellate court standards. In this
expressed it, 'The policeman fabriway, as one district attorney
cates probable cause.'s 8
To many courts, the idea that a police officer would commit perjury during a motion to suppress hearing is not a welcome one.
Judges see police officers simply as men performing their duties.
When the conflict is between a defendant and a police officer as
to testimony concerning the events surrounding the search, the
trial court must decide which of the witnesses to believe. When
such competing versions of events are placed before trial courts,
the latter see police officers as not having "the motive nor the
interest"89 that defense witnesses have to lie. The question becomes one of comparing the biases or prejudices of the witnesses,
and it is the police officer who is seen as being without an interest to further by altering testimony. This judicial frame of reference often has rewarded police perjury with the denial of the motion to suppress illegally seized evidence.
Creating an awareness within the judiciary of this problem is
but a first step. The California Supreme Court recognized this phenomenon and detailed the motivating factors behind police perjury:
DEFENSE OF NARCOTICS CASES, § 3.11 (1972); KING, DEFENSE OF A DRUG ABUSE CASE, CRInINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 57.03(4)
(Bernstein ed. 1973); ROSENGART, BUSTED, 66-67 (1972); TARLow ON SEARCH
WARRANTS, 34 (1973).
The media has recently noted the phenomenon as

e.g., D. BERNim,

well. See Cop's Credibility,TImE, Feb. 4, 1974 at 79.
85. Oaks, supra note 7, at 755 states: "The use of the exclusionary rule
...creates the occasion and incentive for largescale lying by law enforcement officers."
86. In California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1973), the State of Illinois argued as an amicus for the abolishment of the exclusionary rule because
its effect " .. is not deterrence but perjury. The rule fosters false testi-

mony by law officers who feel they must apprehend offenders and are
fearful that minor technical errors will result in their escape." LAW REPRINTS, Vol. 4, n. 10, 362 (1972-73).

87. The difficulty of the judge's task was highlighted by one Assist-

ant District Attorney, who stated flatly that about five out of ten
officers lie when they come into misdemeanor narcotics court and
nearly everyone knows it. But the almost insoluble problem, he
went on, is attempting to determine which five allegations are untrue."
See Note, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search and Seizure Practices
in Narcotics Cases, 4 CoLmw. J. L. & Soc. PROBs. 87, 96 n.40 (1968)
[Hereinafter cited as Effect of Mapp].
88. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WMnHOUT TRIAL, 215 (1967).
89. See People v. Dickerson, 273 Cal. App. 2d 645, 650, 78 Cal. Rptr.

400, 403 (2d Dist. 1969).
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1. that the natural desire of a police officer to see a criminal
brought to justice may cause him to be less than candid in connection with a collateral inquiry which does not go to what appears
to him to be the only relevant question: Was the defendant a
thief? 2. That law enforcement is often a "competitive enterprise"
[citations]; and 3. that a police officer who has conducted an ilmay be subject to criminal, civil, and dislegal search and seizure
90
ciplinary sanctions.

Professor J. Grano, a former Philadelphia prosecutor who handled almost exclusively motions to suppress involving search issues,
observes that "[t]he threat of police perjury is much greater than

most courts are willing to acknowledge." 91 Professor Grano comments that the prosecutors he observed oftentimes successfully
used pre-suppression hearing conferences with police officers as

educational preparation sessions for the policeman to learn the ap92
propriate testimony needed to avoid exclusion of the evidence.
Professor Grano concludes that from his experience as a prosecu-

tor, the exclusionary rule did at least deter deliberate police misconduct. 93 However, his observations concerning police perjury in

search warrant affidavits and at suppression hearings demonstrate
the manner in which that action nullifies the effectiveness of the

exclusionary rule and poisons the judicial process.
Judge Irving Younger of New York has long maintained that
police perjury in suppression hearings is not only prevalent but

pervasive. As a criminal law practitioner and law professor,
Younger wrote 94 of the ease with which policemen successfully
perjure themselves in court. Upon elevation to the bench, Judge
Younger faced the issue; his opinion is an excellent example of
the self-imposed reluctance of the judiciary to do anything meaningful about the problem. In People v. McMurty,95 Judge Younger
90. Id. at 650 n.4, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
91. Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search
Warrants the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405, 408-09

("Perjury is a powerful word, but it must be recognized that no other
will suffice.")
92. Id. at 410.
93. Id. at 423-24.
94. Judge Younger, as a criminal law practitioner and law professor,
wrote bitterly that "every lawyer knows who practices in the criminal
courts, police perjury is commonplace." Younger, Constitutional Protection in Search and Seizure Dead? 3 TRIAL 41 (Aug.-Sept. 1967); see also
Younger, The PerjuryRoutine, Tim NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596.
95. 64 Misc. 2d 63, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Crim. Court City of N.Y. 1970).

confronted the classic motion to suppress hearing where either the
defendant or the police officer was lying. The police officer testified that as he was conducting his normal duties, he saw the defendant drop a container on the ground. The officer walked to
the container, opened it, found marijuana, and arrested the defendant. The defendant, on the other hand, testified that the police
officer approached him, searched his pants, and found the marijuana in a pants pocket. The defendant further testified that he
knew not to drop the container when he saw the officer because
of his past experiences with the police. The problem for the trial
judge was one of credibility. If he believed the officer, then the
defendant's act of dropping the container constituted his abandonment of the object. When the officer saw the marijuana in the
container, he then had probable cause to arrest the defendant. On
the other hand, if Judge Younger believed the defendant, then the
search was without cause, illegal, and the evidence must be suppressed.
In scrutinizing such dropsy testimony, Judge Younger urged four
factors for consideration: 1) that dropsy testimony by the police
be scrutinized with caution;9 2) if inherently unreal, it should be
rejected; 3) if the slightest contradiction of such testimony exists
(or corroboration of the defendant's testimony), the testimony
again should be rejected; and 4) a determination whether the burden of proof has been carried should be carefully examined.9 7 In
New York, unlike the federal system or that in many other states,
the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the illegality of
the search in a suppression hearing. In McMurty, Judge Younger
found none of the above factors helpful in resolving the credibility
conflict except that the defendant had not carried his burden.
However, the problem of police perjury persists. "Its solution,"
according to Judge Younger, "is prosecutor's work. The courts can
only deplore."98
Prosecutors, however, are not doing their work. As Professor
Grano revealed, many prosecutors either wink at the prospect of
fabricated police testimony or subtly encourage it. The District
Attorney for the city of New York, recognizing the extent of the
perjury problem, urged the New York appellate courts to shift the
burden in suppression hearings from the defendant to the prosecu96. This is necessary because "[it becomes apparent that policemen are
committing perjury at least in some [suppression hearings] and perhaps
in all of them." Id. at 196.
97. Id. at 197-98.
98. Id. at 197.
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tion. In Berrios v. People9 9 a divided New York court of appeals
rejected his suggestion that the burden of proof in search and seizure cases be shifted to the prosecution to alleviate the trial court's
problems in detecting and responding to perjured police testimony.
Although the majority opinion recognized the possibility of police
perjury, the court suggested that internal police department procedures, district attorney supervision, and appellate court review
will effectively curtail the alleged abuses. 10 0
The dissent in Berrios authored by Chief Judge Fuld relied upon
the District Attorney's assertion that in a substantial percentage
of dropsy"' cases, police testimony is perjured.10 2 The dissenters
99. 28 N.Y.2d 361, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884, 270 N.E.2d 709 (1971).
100. Id. at 28 N.Y.2d 361, 369, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884, 890, 270 N.E.2d 709, 714
(1971). However, the inability of appellate courts to effectively combat
police perjury has been clearly demonstrated in numerous appellate decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Hood and Hood, 493 F.2d 677 (9th Cir.
1974):
The Hoods claim that the testimony of the police officers was fabricated and cite several cases which comment on alleged increasing
'boiler plate' testimony by police officers regarding 'furtive gestures' and objects seen in 'plain view.'
There can be no doubt that any such police conduct is reprehensible. Our freedoms could be eroded by a totalitarian police as well
as by vandals. But whether or not the alleged improper police
conduct actually occurred is a question of fact to be decided by
the district court. While the Hoods' arguments might be persuasive to the trial judge in assessing diametrically opposed testimony
from the police and the Hoods, we must view the evidence and
all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the government as the prevailing party. Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). It must constantly be borne
in mind that it is the function of the trier of fact "to determine
the credibility of witnesses[,] to resolve evidentiary conflicts and
[to] draw reasonable inferences from proven facts." United States
v. Barham, 466 F.2d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 926 (1973). The trier of fact may disbelieve either the defendants or the police officers and from that disbelief, along with
other evidence, draw a conclusion which is contrary to their testimony. See United States v. Cisneros, 448 F.2d 298, 305 (9th Cir.
1971). As we are not the trier of fact, it is not our function to
review the evidence de novo and we must reject the suggestion
that we engage in conjecture about the police officers' testimony.
The trial judge was in the unique position to observe the demeanor of both the Hoods and the police officers while we have
only the cold record, which is sterile in comparison. Glasser, Barham and Cisneros wisely foreclose us from substituting our view
of the evidence for that of the trial judge unless his findings are
clearly erroneous.
101. A "dropsy" case is one in which the policeman testifies that the
defendant dropped a recognizable packet of contraband to the ground in
plain view of the officer. This is not to be confused with the "drop" case

favored a shift in the burden of proof to the prosecution not only
in the classic dropsy situation, but in all suppression hearings because "[i]t is the experience of many prosecutors and judges that
the problems of credibility and fact-finding raised ...

are not lim-

ited to literal dropsy cases.., but appear in all types of possessory
10 3
narcotics and gambling.
The pervasiveness of the police perjury problem has been amply
documented in studies as well as in individual court cases where
officers were exposed as perjurers. The study by Barlow 0 4 of preMapp and post-Mapp dropsy testimony by New York city policemen during suppression hearings demonstrated an increase in proportions that could only be explained by perjury. As Paul Chevigny concludes, the study demonstrates that:
A large number of officers knowingly violated the provisions of

the Mapp decision and lied about the manner in which evidence
for narcotics arrests was obtained, by constructing a 'dropsy' case
1 05
where none in fact existed.

A similar study utilizing the Barlow data as well as its own
reached the conclusion that:
... uniform police have been fabricating grounds of arrest in
narcotics cases in order to circumvent the requirements of Mapp.
Without knowledge of the results of this study, the two Criminal
Court judges and the two Assistant District Attorneys interviewed
doubted that a substantial reform of police practices in narcotics
had occurred since Mapp. Rather, they believe that police officers
are fabricating evidence to avoid Mapp." 106

The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption0 7 not only
re-emphasized the problem of police perjury, but demonstrated
that the motivation behind it is not always the desire simply to
convict the guilty. Payoffs to New York city policemen by defendants and defense attorneys for testimony certain to bring about
where a policeman wounds or kills a suspect and drops a weapon near
the body to make the shooting appear to have been in self defense. See,
e.g., Schaffer v. Field, 339 F. Supp. 997 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
102. Berrios v. People, 28 N.Y.2d at 370, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91, 270
N.E.2d at 714.
103. Id. 28 N.Y.2d at 372, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 893, 270 N.E.2d at 716.
104. See Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 1960-1962, 4 Cnmv. L. BULL. 549 (1968).
105. See Comments by Paul G. Chevigny, 4 Cram. L. BULL. 581 (1968).
106. Effect of Mapp, supra note 87, at 95-96. The authors quote one
prosecutor who
[S]tressed the ease with which a police officer can construct a
probable-cause argument: the officer merely testifies that the contraband was in open view and, absent corroborating witnesses, the
defendant can seldom convincingly contradict him. Id. at 96.
107. The Commission examined the New York City Police Department
and found police "corruption to be widespread." 1972 KNAPP CoA n SSIoN
REPORT oN Poraco Comaupmoi 1.
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the exclusion of evidence were uncovered.108 This was accomplished by the arresting officer ambiguously writing his arrest report so that in-court testimony could later be shaped depending
upon receipt of the bribe."1 9 The Commission also discovered that
the departmental quota requirements for felony arrests per month
led to "'[f]laking' of individuals-the planting of narcotics upon
a suspected individual." 110 This corrupt activity led to perjurious
police testimony resulting in the convictions of innocent victims.',
A survey of individual cases in which police perjury has been
exposed demonstrates the many ways in which perjury is employed
to "legalize" searches. False statements of fact in affidavits for
search warrants are commonly utilized to deceive magistrates into
issuing search warrants. The courts have constructed differing
tests to cope with this problem with some holding that the defendant cannot go behind the warrant to challenge the facts enumerated in the affidavit. Those jurisdictions following this rule have
created a shield behind which the fabrications of the officer remain
unchallenged. In light of past abuses, this rule is in need of revision to allow such challenges where appropriate.
In Tarlow on Search Warrants,"2 the author includes an exhuastive analysis of the problem of perjured police affidavits to support
search warrants. The author's survey of state and federal law reveals a great deal of uncertainty and differing treatment by the
courts as to whether or not a defendant may raise and litigate
the issue of perjured police affidavits. In the California case of
Theodor v. Superior Court,"3 state statutes allowed the defense
to
challenge the factual veracity of an affidavit in support of a warrant and if material statements contained therein are demonstrated
to be false and if the affiant was unreasonable in believing the
108. Id. at 96-97.
109. Id. at 30.
110. Id. at 28.
111. Waverly Logan, in his testimony before the Commission, told
of an occasion when he flaked a suspect. He had arrested a suspected narcotics seller and planted four bags of narcotics on him.
At the precinct house the prisoner told two narcotics detectives
how the arrest had been made. One of the detectives then took
Logan aside and carefully instructed him on how to write up the
complaint in order to make the case stick. Id., at 104.
112. TAmow oN SEARcH WAmiuxTs, 31-77 (1973).
113. 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972).

truth of such information, those facts must be excised from the
affidavit and probable cause tested from the remaining truthful
information."-'
Other jurisdictions follow different procedural approaches with
several creating insurmountable barriers1 1 behind which perjured
affidavits remain to support otherwise illegal searches. This is an
area of law where reform would best follow the Theodor example.
An important example of the problems discussed in this section
is United States v. Marshall, et at., 488 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1973),
where an appellate court noted the facility with which officers in
this narcotics house search case perjured themselves both in affidavits and in trial testimony:
Two of the agents seem quite willing to make false affidavits, in
which facts are distorted to achieve a result, such as a finding
that seized evidence was in plain view. One agent, when confronted with the facts demonstrating that his affidavit was false,
did not admit that it was false; it was merely 'inconsistent'. 1 6
The Marshall opinion is instructive for its language condemning
the federal agents for their evasive, perjurious testimony which
made a mockery of the witness oath. 1 7 In reversing the lower
114. Id. at 100-01, 501 P.2d at 251, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
115. See TARLow oN SEARCH WARRANTs 39 (1973):
There presently is uncertainty as to whether the right to attack
statements in an affidavit is constitutionally required and as to
the extent and manner in which the right is enforceable in federal
courts. As phrased by Justice Mosk:
The constitutional argument is primarily that the thrust of
Aguilar v. Texas, [378 U.S. 108 (1964)], with its emphasis on
the factual basis for an affiant's conclusion of probable cause,
naturally presupposes correct, and not perjured or erroneous
facts.
For one example of how misrepresentations in warrant affidavits are considered, see United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (1971) discussed in
TARLow, supra at 40-41.
116. United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1973).
117. The court noted the "impenetrable jargon" used by the agents when
testifying in court about their affidavits and conduct:
They do not get into their cars; they enter official government
vehicles. They do not get out of or leave their cars, they exit
them. They do not go somewhere; they proceed. They do not go
to a particular place; they proceed to its vicinity. They do not
watch or look; they surveille. They never see anything; they observe it. No one tells them anything; they are advised. A person
does not tell them his name; he identifies himself. A person does
not say something; he indicates. They do not listen to a telephone
conversation; they monitor it. People telephoning to each other
do not say 'hello;' they exchange greetings. An agent does not
hand money to an informer to make a buy; he advances previously
recorded official government funds. To an agent, a list of serial
numbers does not say what an exhibit is; he says it purports to
be. The agents preface answers to simple and direct questions
with 'to my knowledge'. They cannot describe a conversation by
saying 'he said' and 'I said'; they speak in conclusions. Some-
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court's upholding the consent search, the Marshall court expressed
its doubts that the words allowing the agents to enter the home
were ever spoken." 8
Other appellate courts have noted officer perjury during suppression hearings"1 9 and have made an effort to do something
about it. Although perjury is possible on both sides in any case,
police perjury must be deemed more serious than that of ordinary
citizens. When a police officer violates the public trust by perjuring himself in order to cover up his own previous illegality, he
makes a mockery of criminal justice. As Professor Grano has suggested,
The rules of criminal procedure should take cognizance of the realistic temptation to distort truth and should be designed to encourage resistance to that 2temptation. The present rules do not
encourage resistence ....

1o

The recommendations for monitoring police testimony indicated
by the majority in Barrios v. People, have all to some extent been
tried and have failed. Internal police review, although to be encouraged, is certainly no answer in light of past failure. Shifting
the burden of proof is also not the panacea. Many jurisdictions
currently have the burden placed upon the prosecution to sustain
the legality of the search, yet police perjury has not evaded these
times it takes the combined efforts of counsel and the judge to
get them to state who said what. Under cross-examination, they
seem unable to give a direct answer to a question; they either
spout conclusions or do not understand. This often gives the prosecutor, under the guise of an objection, an opportunity to suggest
an answer, which is then obligingly given. Id. at 1171, No. 1.
118. Id. at 1187.
119. In People v. Carter, 26 Cal. App. 3d 862, 875, 103 Cal. Rptr. 327,
335 (2d Dist. 1972), the appellate court quoted the trial judge's comments
concerning the policeman's testimony at the suppression hearing:
I am not too impressed by Officer Barfield anyway. I think that
if he hadn't been a police officer and had testified the way he
did, that I probably would have referred him to the District Attorney for an investigation as to perjury in the proceeding right before me because I think his conduct there was absolutely reprehensible...
See also Veney v. United States, 344 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1965) where Judge
Skelly Wright criticized an obvious pattern of police perjury during hearings on line-ups. Justice Frankfurter expressed complaints about the lack
of credibility of American policemen. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 172 (1947) (dissenting). Credibility problems extend all the way to
the highest levels of the United States Department of Justice. See, e.g.,
United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973).
120. See Grano, supranote 91 at 423-24.

domains. Judge Younger's criteria for viewing police testimony
with caution in suppression hearings has merit, but as demonstrated in the McMurty case, many cases will balance between
two equally believable (or unbelievable) versions-one by the police officer and one by the defendant. Few courts will rule in
favor of a defendant under such circumstances no matter where
the burden rests.
What is required is a recognition by the judiciary that police
perjury can and does occur during suppression hearings. Second,
the classic contexts in which perjured testimony is forthcoming
should also be recognized. Third, a procedure by which to resolve
the conflict of credibility must be implemented. Once the judiciary
demonstrates that it will take steps to detect and deal with perjured testimony from either side, it will find the problem greatly
diminished. The frequency with which the judiciary faces perjured testimony is directly proportional to its reaction to it. As
demonstrated in a Chicago study, those judges who do not invariably accept such tales find that it is not often presented. Conversely, judges who blindly accept all police testimony in suppression hearings are the judges who most often receive perjury. 21
With statistical studies proving it, candid judges and prosecutors
admitting it, and common sense mandating it, there can be no
doubt that not infrequently during suppression hearings a substantial amount of police perjury takes place. For the judiciary to
refuse to accept this fact is, as Justice Frankfurter once said, "to
ignore as judges what we know as men."'1 22 Examples of contexts
in which police officer testimony is often fabricated to create a
justification for a search are numerous, but would include testimony that: the defendant dropped the contraband in view of the
121. Summarizing the results of a study by the student authors in the
Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems, James Spiotto concludes:
The judge who sat in Narcotics Court in Chicago up until 1969
shared the student authors' cynicism as to the veracity of police
testimony; he could not imagine that defendants would throw evidence to the ground at the sight of police. In many circumstances
it is inconceivable that defendants would still be within the reach
of the 'long arm of the law' after the police officer who had been
cruising at 25 m.p.h. spotted the defendant dropping the packet,
stopped the car, got out of the car, retrieved the packet, opened
it, ascertained the narcotic substance contained therein, and then
and only then put the suspect under arrest. This judge's attitude
seems to have carried over to the present, as can be seen by the
very low percentage of 'drop' cases in Chicago Narcotics Court
(4%). Other jurisdictions, like New York, where judicial disdain
for 'drop' cases did not seem to be a factor, had 28% of all narcotic cases resulting from the 'drop' circumstance. See Spiotto,
supra,note 27 at 269 n.13.
122. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
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officer, 12 the defendant consented to be searched, 2 4 the officer
smelled the contraband prior to the search, 125 a reliable informant
gave information justifying the search, 12 6 proper announcement
127
and notice were given prior to breaking a door to enter a house,
a defendant made a "furtive movement" when stopped, thus arousing the suspicions of an officer toward an area of the defendant's
129
car, 28 or that the evidence conveniently appeared in plain view.
This, of course, does not exhaust the list of possibilities since any
search case may produce false patterns of police testimony to meet
the exigencies of different governmental agents. Nor does it mean
that police perjury invariably will be forthcoming at every suppression hearing. The initial hurdle rests in developing an interest
in the judiciary to recognize police perjury as a problem and then
to do something about it.
Judges who are alert to the problem of police perjury during
suppression hearings have the means by which to put a stop to
it. When the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing is in direct
conflict and equally credible, the court should invite either side
to submit the results of a polygraph examination performed by
a highly competent examiner selected by the trial court. Submis123. See, e.g., Trujillo v. United States, 294 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1961).

124. The Supreme Court has recognized the dubious nature of police
testimony that a defendant would allow a search of an area where contraband is sure to be discovered. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543, 549 n.13 (1968), citing Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819,
820 (D.C. Cir. 1954): "[N]o sane man who denies his guilt could actually
be willing that policemen search his room for contraband which is certain
to be discovered."
125. See, e.g., Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963).
126. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1968) where the dissent

notes "[ilt is not unknown for the arresting officer to misrepresent his

connection with the informer, his knowledge of the informant's reliability,
or other information allegedly obtained from the informer." Id. at 316
n.2.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamonte, 488 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1973).

For comment on the incidence of police perjury on the issue of proper

knock and announcement, see Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80
L.J. 139, 164-65 (1971).
128. See, e.g., Gallik v. Supreme Court, 5 Cal. 3rd 855, 489 P.2d 573,
97 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1971); see also People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807,

YALE

827 (1970), where the California Supreme Court noted "[t]hat police reliance on so-called 'furtive movements' has on occasion been little short
of subterfuge."

129. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169, 1183 (9th Cir.
1973).

sion to the test must be purely voluntary and the results strictly
limited to resolving the dispute at the suppression hearing. In one
recent California case, People v. Cutler,13 0 a trial court was faced
with the common conflict of testimony between a governmental
officer and a defendant during the suppression hearing. The officer testified the defendant consented to a search of his suitcase
which revealed marijuana. The defendant disputed the testimony.
The defendant elected to submit polygraph results which corroborated his version of the events. Admission of the evidence tipped
the balance of credibility in favor of the defendant and led to the
granting of a motion to suppress the evidence.
Polygraph results are uniquely appropriate to resolving the credibility conflicts that are plaguing trial courts during suppression
hearings. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has cited polygraph
results as a highly reliable technique of determining truthfulness. 13 1 Since a jury is not involved in a suppression hearing,
many of the controversial issues surrounding the admission of
polygraphic evidence during the trial of guilt or innocence would
not be involved.13 2 The trial court would select or approve the
competent examiner to test the witness, and reduce the possibility
of an incompetent or a charlatan distorting results in favor of
either party. With the trial judge selecting the examiner, there
would be little judicial time wasted at foundational hearings to
establish the reliability of the technique or the competency of the
examiner. 83 In short, the polygraph technique when limited strictly to the suppression hearing and used to resolve otherwise insoluble credibility conflicts, will prove a valuable tool in determining
where the truth lies.
There exists then a reliable and efficient means by which the
judiciary may resolve seemingly irreconcilable conflicts of credibility between police and lay witnesses. Although the emphasis in
this article has been upon police perjury, there is no question
but that other witnesses before a judge during a suppression hearing may similarly "[p] erform minor surgery upon the facts when
130. People v. Cutler, No. A 126 (Sup. Ct. L.A. Cty. Nov. 6, 1972).
131. United States v. DeBetham, 470 F.2d 1367, 1368 (9th Cir. 1972); the
district court's lengthy analysis of the foundational evidence in support
of the accuracy of polygraph results may be found at 348 F. Supp. 1377
(S.D. Cal. 1972).
132. See United States v. Stranberg, 179 F. Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y.
1959). More recently, eight trial courts have seen fit to admit polygraph
evidence. See Note, The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73 CoLum.
L. REv. 1120 (1973).
133. This general approach was suggested by Judge Joiner in United
States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (W.D. Mich. 1972).
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The focus has been placed on
,
.
the time comes to testify
police perjury to expose a problem too long ignored by most of
the judiciary and offer a prospect for resolution. To continue ignoring the incidence of perjury in suppression hearings demeans
the search for truth to a meaningless charade.
Where the policeman's testimony is seen with the same potential
bias of lay witnesses, the question simply becomes one of resolving
credibility conflicts. To solve this problem, some commentators
1 5
suggest that the credibility of policemen always be in doubt. 3
The
But this suggestion is both unrealistic and unworkable. 13
testimony of each witness must be viewed in light of probable
motivation, bias, and demeanor while on the witness stand. When
these factors fail to achieve a resolution, other available tools must
be utilized. The polygraph is the ideal tool for weeding mendacity
from the courtroom, and restoring veracity to the testimony at suppression hearings is a prerequisite to enforcement of the Fourth
Amendment.
V.

THE EDUCATIVE IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

By providing court review of police conduct, the exclusionary
rule not only gives life to constitutional rights but also provides
an immeasurable educative lesson in Fourth Amendment rights to
the police. One commentator on police performance notes:
The price of exclusion may be worth paying, however, if, as a
consequence, search and seizure standards are further developed
resulting in a higher level of police performance in
and clarified,
the future. 13 7
This is not to say that the courts should have the ultimate or
sole authority in the day-to-day supervision of police conduct.
There are limitations in reliance upon the courts as reviewers of
134. Kuh, In-Field Interrogation: Stop, Question, Detention, and Frisk,
3 Calm. L. BuLL. 597, 604 (1967).

135. Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotics 'Dropsy' Case: A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEO. L.J. 507 (1971).
136. As Martin Garbus has stated in evaluating this suggestion:
[I]f the Georgetown authors think that courts are going to treat
cop-witnesses as though their credibility is always in doubt, then
they're just living in another world. Garbus supra note 84 at 37475.
137. La Fave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary
Rule-Part I-Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REv.
391, 394 (1965).

police conduct.1 38 However, through the exclusionary rule and
suppression hearings the judiciary does have a unique opportunity
to communicate to individual officers and entire departments the
rules governing the citizenry's right to privacy. The failure of the
judiciary to utilize this opportunity undermines the potency of the
exclusionary rule as a deterrent to future police misconduct.
As for the exclusionary rule, its limited impact is attributable
in large measure to inadequate communication between police and
the courts ... police must be be more effectively informed as to
what must be done to avoid exclusion. 8 9
Court analysts describe the small amount of feedback from the
courts and prosecutors to police departments as to questionable
search and seizure practices. 140 When individual police officers involved in a motion to suppress leave the courtroom confused rather
than clarified as to what proper conduct should be, the judiciary
fails in its important educative function. It does not seem too
great a task to require the prevailing party at a motion to suppress
to prepare written findings of fact and conclusions of law for the
judge's signature to be sent by the prosecutor to the involved policeman and the latter's departmental superior. In this manner,
an officer might better know where he went wrong or right in
a search case. Such needed communication might also be a first
step in revising those police departmental policies which produce
illegal searches by officers in the street.
If the judiciary has failed in its role of recognizing and demanding truthful testimony at suppression hearings, it can also be
faulted in this failure to communicate the rule of law to the police.
Many judges have failed to properly use the warrant procedure
to buffer police-citizen confrontations with the authorization of a
neutral and detached judicial officer. An interesting study by La
Fave and Remmington describes how numerous judges abuse the
warrant process by casual and careless authorization of warrants. 41 The study illustrates this point by describing a judge
138. See Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in
CriminalCases, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 785 (1970).
139. LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in
Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MxcH. L. REv. 987,
1012 (1965).
140. The most serious question, on which the present study casts
some light, is whether the exclusionary rule is effective in deterring
unlawful searches. We find generally little feedback from courts
and prosecutors to police departments as to questionable search
and seizure practices. The individual police officer who is involved in a motion to suppress often leaves the courtroom confused rather than clarified as to what his proper conduct should
be. Spiotto, supra note 27, at 276.
141. LaFave &Remington, supranote 139 at 992-1000.
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who, while conducting preliminary hearings would casually and
quickly sign ten to fifteen search warrants. 14 Ironically, this has
led to the same judge holding his own search warrants invalid simply because he did not take the time to do the job correctly in
the first instance. The study concludes
In practice, the extent of real judicial participation when the warrant is issued after arrest is certainly no greater than it is when
the warrant is issued prior to arrest. The process is routine and
does not48 involve judicial inquiry into whether a basis for the arrest
exists.1

Judicial inattention to warrant authorization can only have a biterly frustrating impact on a police officer when an improperly
drawn warrant is declared void to nullify the fruit of the search.
The Supreme Court has ennunciated the principle that the police
should obtain a warrant when time permits prior to a search.

44

The officer looks to the warrant as a means of insuring that the
product of the search will be safely gathered and admissible for
trial purposes. By rubber-stamping police requests for warrants,
the judge increases the risk of nullifying the search later. For
the police officer to be apprised of this fact at a suppression hear145
ing where evidence is quashed is a bitter lesson learned too late.

Finally, with respect to the beneficial educative effect of the exclusionary rule, there is little doubt that the exclusionary rule has
had a noticeable effect on the course of police training. Virtually

every big city police training school places emphasis on the rules
142. Id. at 992-93.
143. Id. at 1000.
144. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 484 (1971):
[T]hat the police must obtain a warrant when they intend to seize
an object outside the scope of a search incident to an arrest-can
be easily understood and applied by the courts and law enforcement officers alike. It is a principle that should work to protect
the citizen without overburdening the police and a principle that
preserves and protects the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.
145. Those judges who sign warrants without consideration of Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969), defeat the purpose of the law.
If methods such as the warrant process are to be encouraged as
a way of protecting individual rights, then those responsible, particularly the judiciary, must take the responsibility seriously and
give it meaning in actual practice. The pro forma issuance of warrants hardly inspires police confidence in the process as an important aspect of democratic government.
URBAN PoL cE FuNCTiON, supra note 34 at 149.

of arrest and search and seizure. 14 6 An inherently beneficient
characteristic of the exclusionary rule is that it puts pressure on
the police to conform to these rules so that the fruit of their work
will not be wasted.
VI.

CONCLUSION

"[T]he methods we employ in the enforcement of our criminal
law have aptly been called the measures by which the quality of
our civilization may be judged.' 147 In assessing the current arguments for abandoning the exclusionary rule in favor of other alternatives, the evolutionary etiology of the rule should be considered.
The rule, like the Fourth Amendment, 148 evolved in the federal
courts after a long history of abuse demonstrated a need for a
mechanism by which the judiciary could oversee police-citizen
confrontations and formulate rules to insure the right to privacy
of the citizenry. The exclusionary rule was applied to the States
only because of the failure of local law enforcement agencies to
devise methods of controlling police misconduct and for lack of
alternative remedies to deter such misconduct. The courts have
been almost alone in attempting to effectively restrain unlawful
privacy invasions by the police because no other institution has
149
made the effort.
In assuming the responsibility of watching over certain police
conduct, the courts have delineated rules of search and seizure
which police are expected to follow or suffer exclusion of evidence
derived from a wrongful search. Because the penalty of exclusion
is disliked by much of the judiciary, the courts have loosely interpreted the rules to uphold searches. The result is that the law
146. Monrad Paulsen, supra note 17 at 95, noted that prior to Mapp,
the states which had the most police training with respect to search rules
were exclusionary rule jurisdictions. Nevertheless, "the average barber receives 4,000 hours of training. The average policeman receives less than
200 hours." NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMvussIoN ON CRIINI!AL JUSTICE STANDArms AND GOALs, A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CamvE, 122 (1973).

147. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 439 (1967).
148. The Fourth Amendment was adopted in view of long misuse
of power in the matter of searches and seizures both in England
and the colonies; and the assurance against any revival of it, so
carefully embodied in the fundamental law, is not to be impaired
by judicial sanction of equivocal methods, which, regarded superficially, may seem to escape the challenge of illegality but which,
in reality, strike at the substance of the constitutional right.
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33-34 (1926).
149. The plain fact is that the Court is in the business of policing
the police because nobody else is and because in a society that
likes to think of itself as 'free' and 'open' someone has to do
the job. Packer, Who Can Police the Police, THE NEw YoRKER
REmw, Sept. 8, 1966, quoted in URAN- POLICE FuNcTION, supra note
34 at 157 n.189.
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of search and seizure (which is also the law governing the right
of privacy) is interpreted to expand police power at the expense
of personal privacy. This is an unfortunate by-product of the exclusionary rule, but one outweighed by the knowledge that without
the rule search law would remain in an unsophisticated infancy.
That the exclusionary rule sometimes brings about certain undesired consequences does not mean that it is undesirable. It provides for judicial review of police conduct that would otherwise
go unmonitored; it gives life to constitutional rights that would
otherwise be disregarded; and it educates the guardians of our security as to the limits to which privacy may be sacrificed in the
name of order.
If the rule has not had the deterrent effect expected, it is because the judiciary has not fulfilled its role in enforcing it. With
proper enforcement by the judiciary of the exclusionary rule the
current deficiencies may be mitigated. Enforcement can only begin with resolution of the pervasive problem of police perjury and
with the beginning of constructive educational feedback to police
officers and departments by the courts. Thus, the solution to the
inadequacies of the rule lies in its vigorous enforcement by the
judiciary, not in its abandonment.

